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Abstract: This paper examines the debt maturity structures of Malaysian firms based on the 
presence of family-related directors (FRDs) on boards. The motivation is derived from the 
board composition literature, which highlights reforms taken place over the years in order 
to ensure proper governance mechanisms. Conversantly, debt maturities are also linked to 
reductions in agency costs whereby firms with short-term borrowings will be subject to 
greater levels of monitoring by markets. Furthermore, this reduces information asymmetry. 
Thus, the paper evaluates the effectiveness of FRDs in alleviating the agency problem by 
studying the trade-off of such presence on debt maturity structures. The study finds that 
firms with the presence of FRDs tend to opt for longer maturity structures. These points 
towards a substitution effect where firms with FRDs will not rely on short-term borrowing 
as a mechanism for reducing agency problems. The findings of the study are further 
validated given that the presence of FRDs is not motivated by firms matching strategy of 
assets versus liabilities. However, these firms also opt for long-term borrowing in order to 
mitigate potential liquidity problems. The study further documents that these firms face 
lower bankruptcy costs. Interestingly, the authors also document that FRD opt to lengthen 
maturity structures during periods of increase in share prices indicating that control by 
family members tend to take into consideration shareholders’ wealth maximization. The 
finding is valid given that most firms with FRD also tend to have significant ownership by 
families.  
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Introduction  
The capital structure puzzle is derived from the irrelevance hypothesis points 
toward an irrelevant debt maturity structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Kraus 
1973). The model is based on the perfect capital market assumptions where firms 
are able to raise financing without transactions costs and thus will be able to alter 
debt composition frequently (Abdul Hadi et al., 2018a). Debt maturity would thus 
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have a direct impact on shareholders’ risk exposure in perfect capital markets and 
thus firm valuations, given that interest rates are exogenous and determined by the 
market, which limits investors’ ability to diversify away this particular risk (Morris, 
1976; Khaw and Lee, 2016). Relaxing the perfect capital market assumptions 
further points towards utilizing debt maturity structures as a tool to reduce agency 
problems (Myers, 1977; Alias et al., 2017), for the purpose of tax planning (Lewis, 
1990; Waluyo, 2018), a tool to send signals to the market as well as balancing the 
demand for liquidity (Diamond and He, 2014).  
The empirical literature shows that studies on debt maturity have received 
considerable attention given that it is a major financing decision, which leads to 
differing structure across firms (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001). In addition, firms are 
constantly trading off the cost versus benefit of short-term versus long-term debt, 
which leads to adjustment to target debt maturity levels that indirectly lead to the 
reduction in agency problems (Hussain et al., 2018a). Proof of managerial action of 
altering the debt composition towards a target level is further obtained from survey 
evidence in developed as well as emerging countries (Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Nor et al., 2011). The argument for longer structures is derived from managers 
avoiding unfavorable terms during the periods of uncertainty caused by economic 
shocks (Antoniou et al., 2006; Mallisa and Kusuma, 2017; Abdul Hadi et al., 
2018b).  
The impact of family-related directors on debt maturity structures is based on the 
role of directors’ independence and effective boards as part of a mechanism for 
corporate governance. This is due to the findings in the literature whereby differing 
monitoring mechanisms exhibit a trade-off (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Booth et 
al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The Malaysian capital market provides a 
unique opportunity to examine these trade-offs given the readily available 
relationship-based economic system (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Nor et al., 2012; 
Haron, 2017). In view of the above, the authors aim to evaluate the substitution 
effect between FRDs and debt maturity where these directors provide an alternative 
internal monitoring mechanism, which gives an interesting insight in the debt 
maturity puzzle.  
The study thus aims to analyze the debt maturity structure based on the presence of 
FRDs, which is derived from the literature on the role of short-term debt in 
reducing agency costs (Myers, 1977). The proposed model of this study measures 
the impact of FRDs on debt maturity structures whilst controlling for known 
determinants (Haron and Ibrahim, 2012; Haron, 2014). The results from the 
empirical analysis show that firms with FRDs tend to rely on longer debt maturity 
structures. The findings indicate a substitution effect where firms with FRDs tend 
to place a larger reliance on long-term debt structures in order to resolve potential 
liquidity problems as these firms face difficulty in raising equity financing (Chu et 
al., 2016). In addition, the increased reliance on longer maturity structures is also a 
result of the potentially reduced agency due to lower moral hazard problems as 
well as lower cost of monitoring arising from the presence of FRDs (Chrisman et 
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al., 2003; Barth et al., 2005; Liew et al., 2017). Long-term relationships within 
family members allow for greater effectiveness while monitoring the managerial 
actions (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Basco and Voordeckers, 2015). 
Furthermore, family firms are also keen to reduce their tax liability, which in 
theory favor controlling shareholders (Orman and Koksal, 2017). In addition, the 
authors find that firms with the presence of FRDs have lower bankruptcy costs. 
The evidence further shows that FRD firms are more likely to increase reliance on 
short-term debt in the event of share price undervaluation, which provides a 
credible signal to the market and thus reduces information asymmetry.  
This paper is thus organized as follows: The next section provides a brief literature 
review, which motivates the study, followed by a section on the methodology that 
details the empirical model. Following on, the study provides a definition of 
variables utilized on the model whilst describing the data. Next, the study reports 
the results from the empirical model and discusses the findings. The final section of 
the paper ends with a conclusion.  
Literature Review 
The authors discuss the relevant literature of the two separate notions in the paper 
in the following sections. The first stems from the debt maturity puzzle whilst and 
the second look at the governance issues surrounding the presence of FRDs on 
boards. Given the background of these two notions, the study thus aims to examine 
the impact of FRDs on the maturity structure of debt.  
Debt Maturity Structures 
There are four main explanations for differing debt maturities in the literature. 
These are the views derived from the impact on agency problems, managing 
liquidity, tax liabilities as well as the signaling theory explanation (Ravid, 1996).  
The first stems from the work of Myers (1977) who argued that short-term 
borrowing reduces the moral hazard problem arising from agency conflicts. This is 
given that constant renewal of debt contracts to finance growth mitigates the 
underinvestment problem (Barnea et al., 1980; Orman and Koksal, 2017). Thus, the 
firm value increases as a result of debt being priced based on growth options 
(Hussain, 2014). The use of short-term borrowing further limits the possibility of 
substitution of assets by managers and thus reduces the probability of risk shifting 
(Buus, 2014; Natocheeva et al., 2017). Shareholders would thus have lower 
incentives to accept a higher risk profile (Shawtari et al., 2016; Hernández-
Cánovas et al., 2016). The second potential explanation has offered in the literature 
for debt maturity structures is based on the views that firms are balancing the need 
for liquidity versus the potentially lower costs of debt as a result of improved debt 
ratings while opting for short-term debt (Malinic et al., 2013; Brick and Liao, 2017; 
Sufian and Kamarudin, 2014; Kamarudin et al., 2018).  
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The third view on debt maturity choices is derived from managers trading-off the 
potential benefit from borrowing in the long term via tax shields afforded by debt 
relative to the costs of raising debt capital which is then expensed in the long-run 
(Kane et al., 1985; Brick and Ravid, 1985; Khalaf, 2017). In the event that the tax 
benefit outweighs the flotation costs, managers prefer a longer debt maturity 
structure (Lewis, 1990). The fourth explanation offered in the literature for the debt 
maturity puzzle is based on the view that quality firms prefer to rely on short-term 
debt as long-term borrowing is attached to a higher premium (Pontoh, 2017). 
Contrastingly, low-quality firms have the incentive to opt for long-term debt given 
that they are able to obtain a lower premium relative to short-term borrowing given 
their riskiness (Khaw and Lee, 2016). Both opposing predictions are centered on 
firms working towards lowering flotation and transaction costs (Flannery, 1986). 
The empirical model has applied in this study controls for these known 
determinants whilst taking into account the presence of FRDs on boards.  
Family Related Directors  
The existing literature shows that family-controlled firms are as prevalent as public 
listed companies across the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). Several studies document that family firms tend to have 
lower agency problems given the incentive to ensure survival and protection of the 
company relative to other shareholders (Chrisman et al., 2003; Croci et al., 2011). 
In addition, it can be further argued that large block ownership by families allow 
family members to participate in boards, which provides a greater presence of 
insiders, hence reducing the monitoring costs (Abdullah et al., 2015; Amin Noordin 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, family members will be privy to business knowledge 
and experience that is passed on and not available to outsiders (Andres, 2008; 
Madison et al., 2016). Lower cost of monitoring leading to more effective 
monitoring also arises as a consequence of long-term relationships among board 
members where FRDs are present given the potential development of positive 
values such as trust, loyalty and altruism (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Barth et 
al., 2005; Miller et al., 2014).  
Presence of family control could, however, lead to some drawbacks. The first 
arises from potential entrenched managers due to lack of check and balance, 
leading to increased overconsumption of perks by FRDs (Pindado and Riquejo, 
2015). In addition, firms which are controlled by families tend to appoint family 
members to executive positions, which are a commonplace in publicly listed firms 
in Malaysia (Chrisman et al., 2003; Goh and Rasli, 2014; Yoong et al., 2015). The 
study is thus motivated to evaluate the potential conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders who possess control rights, which are far greater than their 
cash flow rights. The authors capture the potential for expropriation by families 
through tunneling of wealth in their empirical model (Shyu and Lee, 2009). Thus, 
for the purpose of this study, directors who have an immediate family relationship 
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with the owners and executive offers are considered as FRDs. Our approach is in-
line with our empirical priors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Ng et al., 2015). 
 
Variables 
Data from pre-2001 is not included in the study given the introduction of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000. In order to maximize 
the observations for the period of 2001 – 2017, the study utilizes the unbalanced 
panel data approach, which further improves the inferences from the empirical 
model to evaluate the relationship between FRD and debt maturity (Alaeddin et al., 
2018). This approach also mitigates the problem of unobservable or missing 
variables from the model (Zainudin et al., 2017a). Our definition of variables 
utilized is derived from the literature and captured in table 1 (Deesomsak et al., 
2009; Malinic et al., 2013).  
Table 1. Variables Utilized in the Empirical Model 
Variable Definition 
DM Long-term debt scaled by total debt 
FRD 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm has a minimum 
of 2 members on board which are related 
LEVERAGE 
The ratio of total debt to total debt plus MV of equity and BV of 
preference shares 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
GROWTH 
Total assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity 
divided by total assets 
VOLATILITY 
Absolute value of {[EBITt - EBITt-1]/EBITt-1} minus average of 
{[EBITt - EBITt-1]/EBITt-1 
LIQUIDITY The ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
PROFITABILITY The ratio of EBIT to total assets 
SPP The ratio of annual changes in share prices 
MATURITY The ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
QUALITY Altman's Z-Score 
Empirical Model 
The study models debt maturity as: 
                                          (1) 
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Where the      is the dependent variable and measures the debt maturity for i
th
 
firm at time t,    is the constant for the linear regression model and         is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 when firms have 2 or more family 
members on boards and zero otherwise.  The rest of the variables are known 
determinants of debt maturity derived from the literature to control for firm specific 
characteristics (Mallisa and Kusuma, 2017; Hussain et al., 2018b). In order to 
capture the impact of the presence of FRD on each particular variable, the dummy 
variable has further interacted with each explanatory variable as follows (Hussain 
et al., 2018c): 
                                                     
              (2) 
Data 
In order to maximize the sample size, the authors derive their sample from all 
available firms from Datastream for the period of 2001–2017. The sample includes 
dead firms in order to eliminate survivorship bias. In line with our empirical priors, 
the authors exclude financial firms whereas firm years with missing data are 
eliminated from the sample (Zainudin et al., 2017b). In order to reduce the impact 





 percentile. The study further eliminates observations with missing data. 
The sample of Malaysian firms includes 9 industry dummies as there are 10 
industry classifications, (construction, consumer products, hotels, infrastructure, 
industrial products, mining, plantations, properties, technology and trading/ 
services) as well as time dummies. Finally, we are left with 838 firms with 9,689 
firm-year observations. The study reports the mean values for variable utilized in 
the study in table 2.  

































FRD Firms 0.3628 0.2936 18.2893 2.3436 2.6580 
Non-FRD Firms 0.2436 0.2208 19.3608 1.6805 3.2609 
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FRD Firms 1.8244 0.1124 0.1629 0.3826 2.4361 
Non-FRD Firms 1.5316 0.0693 0.1023 0.3918 2.0834 
T-values (absolute) 2.93*** 4.05*** 5.31*** 0.91 2.04** 
Significance levels of difference are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
The table above compares mean values for firms with FRD and firms without FRD. 
In line with the expectations, the study finds that firms with FRD tend to opt for 
longer maturity structures. Family firms also tend to have higher levels of leverage, 
growth potential, liquidity and profitability. Non-family firms, on the other hand, 
tend to have greater levels of earnings volatility and tend to have better share price 
performance. Family firms tend to have been of higher quality given their greater 
Z-scores which is based on the reduced potential for asset substitution expected in 
family firms.  
Results 
In order to capture the impact of FRD on debt maturity, which is the main objective 
of this paper the authors report the results of regressing equation 1 in the first 
column of table 3.  
Table 3. Debt Maturity and Family Related Directors 






-0.1893*** -0.0516*** -0.0963*** 
(0.0306) (0.0142) (0.0382) 
FRD 
0.0813*** 0.1025*** 0.0931*** 
(0.0264) (0.0285) (0.0320) 
LEVERAGE 
0.1196*** 0.0956*** 0.1293*** 
(0.0251) (0.0225) (0.0321) 
SIZE 
0.1026*** 0.0815*** 0.0928*** 
(0.0361) (0.0261) (0.0324) 
GROWTH 
0.0099 0.0105 0.0088 
(0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0257) 
VOLATILITY 
0.0121 0.0105 0.0116 
(0.0215) (0.0196) (0.0208) 
LIQUIDITY 
0.0523*** 0.0488*** 0.0511*** 
(0.0126) (0.0099) (0.0115) 
PROFITABILITY 
0.1628*** 0.1522*** 0.1596*** 
(0.0426) (0.0385) (0.0402) 
SPP 
0.0324 0.0262 0.0281 
(0.0296) (0.0213) (0.0242) 
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0.4208*** 0.3861*** 0.4181*** 
(0.1255) (0.1131) (0.1185) 
QUALITY 
0.0328 0.0209 0.0265 
(0.0461) (0.0408) (0.0436) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1826 0.3206 0.2651 
Wald test (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LM  624.38*** - - 
HAUSMAN TEST  - 63.24*** 
Significance levels of difference are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 
The estimations are based on the OLS method, which includes time and industry 
dummies that are not reported. The study reports robust standard errors in 
parenthesis (White, 1980). In line with the literature, the study documents that for 
Malaysian firms, debt and size have a positive coefficient supporting the liquidity 
and agency cost reduction argument. Furthermore, the market-to-book ratio, as 
well as earnings, volatility are not significant given that Malaysian firms face 
tending to have low costs of bankruptcy as well as concentrated levels of 
ownership (Deesomsak et al., 2009). The results further confirm the theoretical 
predictions whereby liquidity, profitability, asset maturity and firm quality also 
have a positive correlation with debt maturity structures (Orman and Koksal, 2017; 
Mimouni et al., 2019). In addition, share prices do not influence debt maturity 
(Deesomsak et al., 2009). In line with expectations based on our empirical priors, 
the study finds that the main variable of interest, FRD is positive indicating that 
family firms tend to opt for longer debt maturity ratios (Hillier et al., 2018). This 
further confirms the univariate comparison from table 2.  
The initial results, which are obtained from the OLS approach tends to be biased 
given endogeneity issues between debt maturity and the independent variables 
given that debt maturity and the FRD variable tend to be jointly determined by 
variables, which are not present in the model. Biasness of results is evident from 
the Lagrange Multiplier, which is significant at the 1% level and thus indicates a 
significant difference across firms (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Thus, the data of the 
study suffers from a panel effect. To overcome these econometric issues, the 
authors utilize the fixed and random effects approach as an additional measure of 
robustness, which is reported in columns 2 and 3. The results documented are 
based on standard errors, which are clustered based on the time as well as an 
individual firm dimension (Thompson, 2011). This approach provides econometric 
gains over utilizing White (1980) or Rogers (1993) standard errors (Petersen, 
2009). The diagnostics indicate that the fixed effect model is favored over the 
2018 
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random effect model as evidenced by the significance of the Hausman test (Torres-
Reyna, 2007). The results do not differ qualitatively where the FRD variable 
remains significant.   
In line with our objective of evaluating the impact of FRD on debt maturity whilst 
accounting for firms’ specific characteristics, the authors interact the dummy 
variable with the control variables (as per equation 2). The results are reported in 
table 4 for the OLS, fixed effects and random effect regressions.  
 








-0.1242*** -0.0311*** -0.0591*** 
(0.0281) (0.0081) (0.0165) 
FRD 
0.0452*** 0.0384*** 0.0416*** 
(0.0124) (0.0062) (0.0085) 
LEVERAGE 
0.0925*** 0.0737*** 0.0861*** 
(0.0163) (0.0124) (0.0148) 
FRD x LEVERAGE 
0.0323*** 0.0243*** 0.0305*** 
(0.0085) (0.0056) (0.0067) 
SIZE 
0.1287*** 0.1124*** 0.1231*** 
(0.0437)) (0.0265) (0.0324) 
FRD x SIZE 
-0.0325*** -0.0286*** -0.0295*** 
(0.0106) (0.0052) (0.0063) 
GROWTH 
0.0062 0.0085 0.0724 
(0.1025) (0.1426) (0.1336) 
FRD x GROWTH 
0.1025 0.0925 0.0993 
(0.0926) (0.0829) (0.0882) 
VOLATILITY 
0.0025 0.0018 0.0022 
(0.0306) (0.0281) (0.0293) 
FRD x VOLATILITY 
0.0112*** 0.0095*** 0.0106*** 
(0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0032) 
LIQUIDITY 
0.0327*** 0.0265*** 0.0293*** 
(0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0072) 
FRD x LIQUIDITY 
0.0364*** 0.0291*** 0.0323*** 
(0.0092) (0.0060) (0.0075) 
PROFITABILITY 
0.1251*** 0.0957*** 0.1128*** 
(0.0392) (0.0252) (0.0325) 
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FRD x PROFITABILITY 
0.0684*** 0.0561*** 0.0625*** 
(0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0142) 
SPP 
0.0125 0.0082 0.093 
(0.0651) (0.0522) (0.0565) 
FRD x SPP 
0.0275** 0.0245** 0.0254** 
(0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0123) 
MATURITY 
0.4133*** 0.3525*** 0.3736*** 
(0.0962) (0.0862) (0.0921) 
FRD x MATURITY 
0.0125 0.0251 0.0184 
(0.1629) (0.1422) (0.1527) 
QUALITY 
0.0212 0.0152 0.0193 
(0.1365) (0.0857) (0.1136) 
FRD x QUALITY 
0.0092 0.0062 0.0075 
(0.0355) (0.0426) (0.0389) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2451 0.3623 0.3311 
Wald test (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LM 582.18*** - - 
HAUSMAN TEST - 52.45*** 
Significance levels of difference are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 
The diagnostics reported in table 4 allow us to similarly conclude that OLS 
regressions suffer from panel bias and thus are not suitable. In addition, the fixed 
effect method is preferred over the random effect approach. The results show that 
the interaction with leverage is significantly positive whilst the term with size is 
negatively significant. The findings concur with the literature where family firms 
opt for longer-term borrowing in order to mitigate potential liquidity risks (Díaz-
Díaz et al., 2016). In addition, non-FRD firms tend to face greater levels of moral 
hazard. Growth opportunity remains insignificant. Interestingly, the interaction 
term with earnings volatility is significantly indicating that family firms tend to 
have lower levels of bankruptcy. The findings highlight the potential for asset 
substitution effect amongst non-family firms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Croci et 
al., 2011).  
The study further documents that the interaction terms for measuring liquidity and 
profitability are also positively implying that family firms tend to favor longer 
maturity structures in order to reduce the probability for cash shortages as well as 
bankruptcy costs. This concurs with the results in Ben-Nasr (2015) where 
2018 
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ownership concentration amongst French firms amongst families leads to longer 
debt maturity structures. In addition, family firms are also reducing their tax 
obligations by lengthening maturity structures. Interestingly, the authors find that 
the interaction term with share price performance is positive. The finding indicates 
that family firms are willing to shorten maturity structures during periods of 
declining shares in order to send signals to the market. They are further keen to 
capture gains to shareholders’ wealth during periods of increasing share prices by 
opting for long-term borrowing. A possible explanation for this observation is 
offered by Jain and Shao (2015) where family firms are unlikely to resort to 
external sources of equity financing given the desire to prevent dilution of 
ownership and control. The results further indicate that family firms are not 
influenced by the asset maturity and firm quality while deciding on maturity 
structure of debt. It is quite plausible that these firms tend to have higher asset 
quality and thus maturity of debt is influenced by the probability of bankruptcy 
(Chen et al., 2014).  
Conclusions 
The authors utilize a set of unbalanced panel data from Malaysia in order to capture 
the impact of the presence of FRDs on debt maturity structures. Firms with 2 or 
more family related members on board of directors are categorized as family firms 
for the purpose of this study. The study is able to draw several conclusions from 
the empirical findings. The analysis allows us to conclude that family firms tend to 
opt for longer debt maturity structures. This suggests that family firms are less 
likely to rely on short-term debt as a disciplining tool and the results tend to concur 
with the liquidity explanation offered in the literature. Presence of family insiders 
on boards is likely to reduce agency problems and thus a substitution effect is 
observed. The presence of family insiders on boards also thus leads to the reduced 
potential for managerialism and other agency conflicts at the expense of 
shareholders. Thus, non-family firms would opt for short-term debt as a 
disciplining tool to reduce agency problems. In addition, the study finds that family 
firms are inclined to be more concerned with managing liquidity requirements and 
are likely to have lower bankruptcy costs given that the likelihood of asset 
substitution is reduced. Thus, it is likely that family firms would have higher 
quality assets and thus be less reliant on an external source of financing as these 
assets would tend to generate greater levels of cash flows. Therefore, managers of 
non-family firms who are more likely to resort to external financing are then facing 
greater levels of scrutiny by the capital markets. The results further indicate that 
family firms prefer a greater proportion of long-term borrowing in order to avoid 
potential cash shortages whilst attempting to reduce their tax obligations. The 
results are in line with theoretical expectations where family firms are likely to face 
difficulty in raising equity from capital markets given the potential for tunneling at 
the expense of minority shareholders. Family firms are further concerned with 
share price performance and thus likely to shorten maturity structure during periods 
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of declining prices and lengthen maturity structure during periods of appreciating 
prices given the direct impact on controlling shareholders’ wealth. This further 
enforces the earlier observation where family firms are more likely to rely on 
internally generated cash flows to fund future growth and are less reliant on 
external equity financing. In addition, the reduction in agency problems would also 
likely to translate into greater potential for shareholders’ wealth maximization.  
References 
Abdul Hadi A.R., Hussain H.I., Suryanto T., Yap T.H., 2018a, Bank’s Performance and Its 
Determinants – Evidence from Middle East, Indian Sub-Continent and African Banks, 
“Polish Journal of Management Studies”, 17(1).    
Abdul Hadi A.R., Zafar S., Iqbal T., Zafar Z., Iqbal Hussain H., 2018b, Analyzing Sectorial 
Level Determinants of Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in ASEAN, “Polish 
Journal of Management Studies”, 17(2).  
Abdullah M., Evans L., Fraser I., Tsalavoutas I., 2015, IFRS Mandatory disclosures in 
Malaysia: The influence of family control and the value (ir) relevance of compliance 
levels, Accounting Forum, 39(4).  
Agrawal A., Knoeber C.R., 2001, Do some outside directors play a political role?, “Journal 
of Law and Economics”, 44(1). 
Alaeddin O., Rana A., Zainudin Z., Kamarudin F., 2018, From Physical to Digital: 
Investigating Consumer Behaviour of Switching to Mobile Wallet, “Polish Journal of 
Management Studies”, 17 (2).  
Alias N., Yaacob M.H., Jaffar N., 2017, Governance structure, corporate restructuring and 
performance, “Polish Journal of Management Studies”, 15(1).  
Amin Noordin B.A., Kamarudin F., Mohamad Anwar N.A., 2016, Wealth Effect and 
Macroeconomics Factors of a Firm’s International Merger and Acquisition Exercise: 
Empirical Evidence from Multinational Firms, Engineering Economics, 26(5).  
Anderson R.C., Reeb D.M., 2003, Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, “Journal of Finance”, 58(3). 
Andres C., 2008, Large shareholders and firm performance - An empirical examination of 
founding-family ownership, “Journal of Corporate Finance”, 14(4).  
Antoniou A., Guney Y., Paudyal K., 2006, The determinants of debt maturity structure: 
evidence from France, Germany and the UK, European Financial Management, 12(2).  
Barnea A., Haugen R.A., Senbet L.W., 1980, A rationale for debt maturity structure and 
call provisions in the agency theoretic framework, “Journal of Finance”, 35(5).  
Barth E., Gulbrandsen T., Schone P., 2005, Family ownership and productivity: The role of 
owner-management, “Journal of Corporate Finance”, 11(1-2).  
Basco R., Voordeckers W., 2015, The relationship between the board of directors and firm 
performance in private family firms: A test of the demographic versus behavioral 
approach, “Journal of Management & Organization”, 21(4). 
Ben-Nasr H., Boubaker S., Rouatbi W., 2015, Ownership structure, control contestability, 
and corporate debt maturity, “Journal of Corporate Finance”, 35. 
Booth J.R., Cornett M.M., Tehranian H., 2002, Boards of directors, ownership and 
regulation, “Journal of Banking and Finance”, 26. 
Brick I.E., Liao R.C., 2017, The joint determinants of cash holdings and debt maturity: the 
case for financial constraints, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 48(3). 
2018 
Vol.18 No.2 
POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
Hussain H.I., Abidin I.S.Z., Ali A., Kamarudin F. 
 
130 
Brick I.E., Ravid S.A., 1985, On the relevance of debt maturity structure, “Journal of 
Finance”, 40(5). 
Buus T., 2014, A general free cash flow theory of capital structure, “Journal of Business 
Economics and Management”, 16(3). 
Chen T.Y., Dasgupta S., Yu Y., 2014, Transparency and financing choices of family firms, 
“Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis”, 49(2). 
Chrisman J.J., Chua J.H., Zahra S.A., 2003, Creating wealth in family firms through 
managing resources: Comments and extensions, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
27(4). 
Chu E.Y., Lai T.S., Song S.I., 2016, Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints in 
Family Controlled Firms: Evidence from Malaysia, “International Journal of Business 
and Society”, 17(3). 
Claessens S., Djankov S., Lang L.H.P., 2000, The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations, “Journal of Financial Economics”, 58(1-2). 
Croci E., Doukas J.A., Gonenc H., 2011, Family control and financing decisions, European 
Financial Management, 17(5). 
DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L., 1985, Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public 
corporations with dual classes of common stock, “Journal of Financial Economics”, 
14(1).  
Deesomsak R., Paudyal K., Pescetto G., 2009, Debt maturity structure and the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, “Journal of Multinational Financial Management”, 19(1).  
Diamond D.W., He Z., 2014, A theory of debt maturity: the long and short of debt 
overhang, “Journal of Finance”, 69(2).  
Díaz-Díaz N.L., García-Teruel P.J., Martínez-Solano P., 2016, Debt maturity structure in 
private firms: Does the family control matter?, “Journal of Corporate Finance”, 37. 
Faccio M., Lang L.H.P., 2002, The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations, 
“Journal of Financial Economics”, 65(3). 
Flannery M.J, 1986, Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice, “Journal of 
Finance”, 41(1).  
Goh C.F., Rasli A., 2014, CEO duality, board independence, corporate governance and 
firm performance in family firms: Evidence from the manufacturing industry in 
Malaysia, Asian Business & Management, 13(4).  
Graham J.R., Harvey C.R., 2001, The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence 
from the field, “Journal of Financial Economics”, 60(2-3). 
Haniffa R., Cooke T.E., 2002, Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian 
corporations, Abacus, 38(3). 
Haniffa R., Hudaib M., 2006, Corporate governance structure and performance of 
Malaysia listed companies, “Journal of Business Finance and Accounting”, 33(7-8). 
Haron R., 2014, Capital structure inconclusiveness: evidence from Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore, “International Journal of Managerial Finance”, 10(1).  
Haron R., 2017, Ownership structure of family-owned firms and debt financing. Evidence 
on Shari’ah compliant firms in Malaysia, Al-Shajarah, Special Issue of IIBF.  
Haron R., Ibrahim K., 2012, Target capital structure and speed of adjustment: Panel data 
evidence on Malaysia Shariah compliant securities, “International Journal of 
Economics, Management and Accounting”, 20(2).  
POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 





Hernández-Cánovas G., Mínguez-Vera A., Sánchez-Vidal J., 2016, Ownership structure 
and debt as corporate governance mechanisms: an empirical analysis for Spanish 
SMEs, “Journal of Business Economics and Management”, 17(6). 
Hillier D., Martínez B., Patel P.C., Pindado J., Requejo I., 2018, Pound of flesh? Debt 
contract strictness and family firms, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 42(2). 
Hussain H.I., 2014, Do Firms Time the Equity Market in a Non-Linear Manner? Evidence 
from the UK, “The International Journal of Business and Finance Research”, 8(4). 
Hussain H.I., Hadi A.R.A., Mohamed-Isa A., Salem M.A., Kamarudin F., Jabarullah N.H., 
2018b, Adjustment to Target Debt Maturity and Equity Mispricing: Evidence from Asia 
Pacific, “Polish Journal of Management Studies”, 17(2).  
Hussain H.I., Shamsudin M.F., Anwar N.A.M., Salem M.A., Jabarullah N.H., 2018c, The 
Impact of Sharia Compliance on the Adjustment to Target Debt Maturity of Malaysian 
Firms, “European Research Studies Journal”, 21(1).  
Hussain H.I., Shamsudin M.F., Salehuddin S., Jabarullah N.H., 2018a, Debt Maturity and 
Shari'ah Compliance: Evidence from Malaysian Panel Data, “European Research 
Studies Journal”, 21(1). 
Jain B.A., Shao Y., 2015, Family firm governance and financial policy choices in newly 
public firms, “Corporate Governance: An International Review”, 23(5). 
Kamarudin F., Sufian F., Nassir A.M., Anwar N.A.M., Ramli N.A., Tan K.M., Hussain 
H.I., 2018, Price efficiency on Islamic banks vs. conventional banks in Bahrain, UAE, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia: impact of country governance, “International 
Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance”, 11(4).  
Kane A., Marcus A.J., McDonald R.L., 1985, Debt policy and the rate of return premium to 
leverage, “Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis”, 20(4). 
Khalaf B.K.A., 2017, Empirical Investigation of Symmetric and Asymmetric Target 
Adjustment Models: Capital Structure of Non-Financial Firms in Jordan, “International 
Journal of Economics and Finance”, 9(3).  
Khaw K.L.H., Lee B.C.J., 2016, Debt Maturity, Underinvestment Problem and Corporate 
Value, “Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance”, 12(1).  
Kraus A., 1973, The bond refunding decision in an efficient market, “Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis”, 8(5).  
La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., 1999, Corporate ownership around the 
world, “Journal of Finance”, 54(2). 
Lewis C.M., 1990, A multi-period theory of corporate financial policy under taxation, 
“Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis”, 25(1). 
Liew C.Y., Alfan E., Devi S., 2017, Family firms, expropriation and firm value: Evidence 
of the role of independent directors' tenure in Malaysia, “International Journal of 
Organizational Leadership”, 6(1). 
Madison K., Holt D.T., Kellermanns F.W., Ranft A.L., 2016, Viewing family firm behavior 
and governance through the lens of agency and stewardship theories, Family Business 
Review, 29(1).  
Malinic D., Dencic-Mihajlov K., Ljubenovic E., 2013, The determinants of capital 
structure in emerging capital markets: Evidence from Serbia, “European Research 
Studies Journal”, 16(2). 
Mallisa M., Kusuma H., 2017, Capital structure determinants and firms’ performance: 
empirical evidence from Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, “Polish Journal of 
Management Studies”, 16(1).  
2018 
Vol.18 No.2 
POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
Hussain H.I., Abidin I.S.Z., Ali A., Kamarudin F. 
 
132 
Miller D., Le Breton‐Miller I., Minichilli A., Corbetta G., Pittino D., 2014, When do 
Non‐Family CEOs Outperform in Family Firms? Agency and Behavioural Agency 
Perspectives, “Journal of Management Studies”, 51(4).  
Mimouni K., Temimi A., Goaied M., Zeitun R., 2019, The Impact of Liquidity on Debt 
Maturity after a Financial Crisis: Evidence from the GCC Region, Emerging Markets 
Finance and Trade, 55(1). 
Modigliani F., Miller M., 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment, American Economic Review, 48.  
Morris J.R., 1976, On corporate debt maturity strategies, “Journal of Finance”, 31(1).  
Myers S.C., 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, “Journal of Financial 
Economics”, 5(2).  
Natocheeva N.N., Rovensky Y.A., Belyanchikova T.V., Rusanov Y.Y., 2017, The 
Diversification of Banking Capital Sources and Cash Flow Granularity in Merger and 
Acquisition Transactions, “European Research Studies Journal”, 20(4A). 
Ng S.H., Ong T.S., Teh B.H., Soh W.N., 2015, How is firm performance related to family 
ownership in Malaysia and does board independence moderate the relationship?, 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 11(2).  
Nor F.M., Haron R., Ibrahim K., Ibrahim I., Alias N., 2011, Determinants of target capital 
structure: Evidence on South East Asia countries, “Journal of Business and Policy 
Research”, 6(3). 
Nor F.M., Ibrahim K., Haron R., Ibrahim I., Alias M.A., 2012, Practices of capital 
structure decisions: Malaysia survey evidence, International Review of Business 
Research Papers”, 8(1).  
Orman C., Köksal B., 2017, Debt maturity across firm types: Evidence from a major 
developing economy, Emerging Markets Review, 30.  
Petersen M.A., 2009, Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches, Review of Financial Studies, 22(1). 
Pindado J., Requejo I., 2015, Family business performance from a governance perspective: 
A review of empirical research, “International Journal of Management Reviews”, 17(3).  
Pontoh W., 2017, The Capital Structure: Is Debt just a Policy or Requirement?, “European 
Research Studies Journal”, 20(2).  
Rajan R.G., Zingales L., 1998, Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis, 
“Journal of Applied Corporate Finance”, 11(3). 
Ravid S., 1996, Debt Maturity: A Survey, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 
5. 
Rogers W., 1993, Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, Stata Technical 
Bulletin, 13. 
Scherr F., Hulburt H., 2001, The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms, Financial 
Management, 30.  
Shawtari F.A., Salem M.A., Hussain H.I., Alaeddin O., Thabit O.B., 2016, Corporate 
governance characteristics and valuation: Inferences from quantile regression, “Journal 
of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science”, 21(41).  
Shyu Y.W., Lee C.I., 2009, Excess control rights and debt maturity structure in 
family‐controlled firms, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(5).  
Sufian F., Kamarudin F., 2014, The impact of ownership structure on bank productivity and 
efficiency: Evidence from semi-parametric Malmquist Productivity Index, Cogent 
Economics & Finance, 2(1). 
POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 





Thompson S.B., 2011, Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and 
time, “Journal of Financial Economics”, 99(1). 
Torres-Reyna O., 2007, Panel data analysis fixed and random effects using Stata, Data & 
Statistical Services, Princeton University. 
Waluyo W., 2018, Do Efficiency of Taxes, Profitability and Size of Companies affect Debt? 
A Study of Companies Listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange, “European Research 
Studies Journal”, 21(1). 
White H., 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, 48. 
Yoong L.C., Alfan E., Devi S.S., 2015, Family firms, expropriation and firm value: 
Evidence from related party transactions in Malaysia, “Journal of Developing Areas”, 
49(5). 
Zainudin Z., Ibrahim I., Hussain H.I., Hadi A.R.A., 2017a, Debt and Financial 
Performance of REITs in Malaysia: An Optimal Debt Threshold Analysis, “Jurnal 
Ekonomi Malaysia”, 51(2). 
Zainudin Z., Ibrahim I., Said R.M., Hussain H. I., 2017b, Debt and Financial Performance 
of Reits In Malaysia: A Moderating Effect of Financial Flexibility, “Jurnal Pengurusan 
(UKM Journal of Management)”, 50. 
ZAPADALNOŚĆ ZADŁUŻENIA I DYREKTORZY ZWIĄZANI Z RODZINĄ: 
DOWODY Z ROZWIJAJACEGO SIĘ RYNKU 
Streszczenie: W niniejszym artykule przeanalizowano strukturę zapadalności długu 
malezyjskich firm w oparciu o obecność dyrektorów rodzinnych (FRD) w zarządach. 
Motywacja pochodzi z literatury poświęconej składom zarządów, która podkreśla reformy, 
które miały miejsce od lat w celu zapewnienia odpowiednich mechanizmów zarządzania. 
Konsekwentnie, zapadalność długu jest również powiązana z obniżeniem kosztów 
pośrednictwa, w wyniku czego firmy o pożyczkach krótkoterminowych będą podlegać 
większemu monitorowaniu na rynkach. Ponadto zmniejsza to asymetrię informacji. 
W związku z tym, w artykule dokonano oceny skuteczności FRD w łagodzeniu problemu 
agencji poprzez zbadanie zysku takiej obecności w strukturach dojrzałości długu. Badanie 
wykazało, że firmy z obecnością FRD wybierają dłuższe struktury dojrzałości. Wskazuje to 
na efekt substytucyjny, w którym firmy z FRD nie będą polegać na pożyczkach 
krótkoterminowych jako mechanizmie zmniejszającym problemy agencji. Wyniki badania 
są dalej potwierdzane, ponieważ obecność FRD nie jest uzasadniona przez firmy, które 
dopasowują strategię aktywów do zobowiązań. Firmy te również wybierają 
długoterminowe pożyczki, aby złagodzić potencjalne problemy z płynnością. Badanie to 
dokumentuje również, że firmy te ponoszą niższe koszty bankructwa. Co ciekawe, autorzy 
dokumentują również, że FRD opowiadają się za przedłużeniem struktur zapadalności 
w okresach wzrostu cen akcji, wskazując, że kontrola członków rodziny ma tendencję do 
uwzględniania maksymalizacji zamożności akcjonariuszy. Stwierdzenie jest słuszne, biorąc 
pod uwagę, że większość firm z FRD ma również znaczny udział rodzinny w strukturze 
własności. 
Słowa kluczowe: zapadalność zadłużenia, struktura kapitałowa, dyrektorzy rodzinni, skład 
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债务成熟度和家庭相关董事：来自发展中市场的证据 
摘要：本文根据董事会中与家庭相关的董事（FRD）的存在，考察了马来西亚公司的债
务期限结构。这一动机来自董事会组成文献，该文献强调了多年来为确保适当的治理
机制而进行的改革。相反，债务期限也与代理成本的减少有关，因此短期借款的公司
将受到市场更高水平的监管。此外，这减少了信息不对称。因此，本文通过研究债务期
限结构中存在这种存在的权衡来评估FRD在缓解代理问题方面的有效性。该研究发现
，存在FRD的公司倾向于选择更长的成熟度结构。这些指向取代效应的地方，那些拥
有FRD的公司不会依赖短期借款作为减少代理问题的机制。鉴于FRD的存在不是由匹
配资产与负债策略的公司推动的，因此该研究的结果得到进一步验证。然而，这些公
司也选择长期借款以减轻潜在的流动性问题。该研究进一步证明，这些公司面临较低
的破产成本。有趣的是，作者还记录了FRD选择在股价上涨期间延长期限结构，表明
家族成员的控制倾向于考虑股东的财富最大化。这一发现是有效的，因为大多数FRD
公司也倾向于拥有家庭的重要所有权。 
关键词：债务期限，资本结构，家族相关董事，董事会构成，公司治理，家族企业 
